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Abstract:  The first industrial hospital in America opened in 1840 in Lowell, 
Massachusetts.  The Lowell Corporation Hospital was sponsored by the town‟s textile 
employers for ninety years.  This article analyses the contextual complications 
surrounding the employers‟ sustained funding of the hospital. Motivations for sustained 
sponsorship included paternalism, clinical excellence, business custom, the labour 
situation in Lowell, civic duty and the political advantages of paternalism.  By analysing 
the changing local context of the hospital, this article argues that a broader, more 
integrated approach to healthcare histories and institution histories is needed if we are to 
fully understand the myriad of healthcare providers and their local and national 
importance. 
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Introduction 
In 1840, the first industrial hospital in America opened in the country‟s principle cotton 
manufacturing town of Lowell, Massachusetts.  It was sponsored by the local textile 
employers who were collectively known as the Lowell Corporation. They provided most 
of the town‟s employment and dominated the town council.  The Corporation wanted to 
„establish and maintain a hospital for the convenience and comfort of the persons 
employed by them respectively when sick or needing medical or surgical treatment and to 
contribute the funds necessary for that purpose.‟3  Individual firms contributed funds in 
proportion to their employee numbers.  Patients were only expected to pay their room and 
board (initially $1.75 per week for women and $2.75 per week for men).  Moreover, 
according to some accounts, if workers could not afford this then their employer provided 
a surety to the Corporation that was to be repaid when the patient recovered.
4
  For 
                                                 
3
 Articles of Agreement of the Lowell Hospital Association, November 1839 (Boston:  Cassady 
and March, 1839), 3; Annual Report of the Lowell Hospital Association, January 1, 1888 (Lowell:  
Vox Populi Press, 1888), 3. 
4
 Sources conflict about whether this was indeed the case.  It is also unclear how many patients 
actually repaid this debt, whether any interest was charged or what the penalties were for non-
payment.  Turner‟s Lowell Directory states „If the patients are able, they are to pay to the 
Superintendent; if not able, the corporations from which they go are responsible, and the patients 
are then responsible to the corporations.‟  Turner’s Lowell Directory and Annual Register for the 
Year of our Lord 1846 (Lowell:  Pillsbury and Knapp), 35. 
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twenty-seven years this was the only hospital in Lowell and all city residents could use its 
services.  While the hospital benefited the city it was not a profitable venture.  Despite 
this, the hospital operated on the same financial basis for ninety years.  In 1930, the 
declining New England textile industry combined with skyrocketing medical costs meant 
the remaining textile firms could no longer support the hospital. Rather than close it, the 
Corporation essentially gave the hospital to the Boston Archdiocese for $1.   
The Lowell Corporation Hospital (LCH) was a unique nineteenth century 
employer healthcare initiative.  While later in the century other employers, including 
railroad, timber and mining companies, also established complex medical and beneficial 
organisations to care for workers, these innovations were frequently reluctant and limited 
efforts to minimise accident costs, improve workers‟ loyalty and decrease turnover.  Very 
few initiatives included employer funded hospitals.
5
  Instead, most large employers held 
formal or informal arrangements with physicians, contributed to a local dispensary and 
later in the century, they endowed hospital beds for workers.
6
  Hence, the Lowell 
                                                 
5
 Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails:  American Railroad Accidents and Safety (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins, 2006), 156; Henry J. Short, Railroad Doctors, Hospitals, and Associations:  
Pioneers in Comprehensive, Low Cost Medical Care (Lakeport, CA: Shearer/Graphic Arts, 
1986); Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave:  Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper 
Mines (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1991), ch 11; and Alan Derickson, Workers’ Health, 
Workers’ Democracy:  The Western Miners’ Struggle, 1891-1925 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988), ch 4-6. 
6
 Aldrich, op. cit. (note 4), 156, 157; Charles Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers:  The Rise of 
America’s Hospital System (New York:  Basic Books, 1987), 21-22; and Morris Vogel, The 
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Corporation Hospital was both atypical and much earlier than other employer healthcare 
initiatives.   
Through telling the story of the LCH this article argues that hospitals, and indeed 
any institution, cannot be understood outside of the complexities of their changing 
context.  To that end, this article firstly explains why Lowell manufacturers chose to 
invest in a hospital when alternative forms of medical care were available in the city and 
at a time when hospitals offered little in the way of therapeutics that were not available 
outside hospital walls.  It highlights how the first physician and surgeon, Dr Gilman 
Kimball was central to the early success of the hospital.  He placed the hospital firmly in 
line with medical thinking and ensured the hospital fulfilled both employer and 
community needs, while also making it a centre for gynaecological excellence.  Next, the 
paper reveals how during the latter half of the century, hospital contributions became a 
philanthropic custom entwined within business culture. The hospital had become a 
community resource, providing services for both adults and children.  It treated both 
workplace and street injuries, for which extensive outpatient facilities were developed.  
The textile firms met their financial obligations from custom and without complaint.  
Lastly, this paper considers how the hospital faced the economic challenges of the early 
decades of the twentieth century.  Scientific and medical advancements led to 
skyrocketing healthcare costs.  However, the employers‟ sustained their unwavering 
commitment to the hospital, viewing it largely as a form of paternalistic welfare, but with 
some political benefits.  To these ends, this article draws on a wide range of primary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Invention of the Modern Hospital:  Boston, 1870-1930 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1980). 
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sources, including hospital records and annual reports, city directories, Board of Health 
reports, workers‟ letters, transcribed oral histories, newspapers, medical society papers, 
medical journals and legislation.  Combined, they provide the broad local context 
necessary for understanding the institution and its development and provide a multi-
layered picture of the business complexities surrounding operating hospitals.  
This contextual analysis of the Lowell Corporation Hospital extends existing 
hospital histories which have traditionally emphasised either how hospitals were medical 
and social institutions or the internal workings of the hospital.
7
  Less is known about the 
                                                 
7
 Rosenberg, op. cit. (note 4); Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and In Wealth:  American Hospitals 
in the Twentieth Century (New York:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Vogel, op. cit. 
(note 5); David Rosner, A Once Charitable Enterprise:  Hospitals and Health Care in Brooklyn 
and New York, 1885-1915 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1982); John H. Warner, 
„Power, Conflict, and Identity in Mid-Nineteenth-Century American Medicine:  Therapeutic 
Change at the Commercial Hospital in Cincinnati‟, The Journal of American History, 73, 4 
(1987), 934-56; Helena M. Wall, „Feminism and the New England Hospital, 1949-1961‟, 
American Quarterly, 32, 4 (1980), 435-52; Joel Howell, Technology in the Hospital:  
Transforming Patient Care in the Early Twentieth Century (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins UP, 
1995); Sandra Opdycke, No One was Turned Away:  The Role of Public Hospitals in New York 
City  since 1900 (New York: OUP, 1999); Jeanne Kisacky, „Restructuring Isolation:  Hospital 
Isolation:  Hospital Architecture, Medicine, and Disease Prevention‟, Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, 79, 1 (2005), 1-49; Robert Asher, „The Limits of Big Business Paternalism:  Relief for 
Injured Workers in the Years before Workmen‟s Compensation‟, in David Rosner and Gerald 
Markowitz (eds), Dying for Work:  Workers' Safety and Health in Twentieth-Century America 
(Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1989), 19-33; Stephen C. Kenny, „”A Dictate of Both 
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complicated contexts that influenced their course and longevity. This paper also advances 
histories of the social welfare movements and employers‟ welfare that have stressed 
health insurance.
8
  It utilises a unique consortium of mill owners to illustrate the 
motivations and limitations of the business elite who funded early hospitals. Their 
substantial, sustained investment in the LCH was entwined with the Lowell community, 
philanthropy, business needs and to an extent, state politics.  These cannot be separated 
because local and state peculiarities determined the nature and course of healthcare 
provision in Lowell.  Work, with all its connotations, derivations and definitions, affects 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interest and Mercy”?  Slave Hospitals in the Antebellum South‟, Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences, 65, 1 (2010), 1-47, esp. 5 and 7; Katherine Bankole, „A Critical 
Inquiry of Enslaved African Females and the Antebellum Hospital Experience‟, Journal of Black 
Studies, 31, 5 (May 2001), 517-38. 
8
 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers:  The Political Origins of Social Policy in the 
United States (Harvard:  Harvard University Press, 1992); Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the 
United States:  Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1995); Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness:  The Politics of Health Insurance in 
Progressive America (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Mark Aldrich, 
„Train Wrecks to Typhoid Fever:  The Development of Railroad Medicine Organizations, 1850 to 
World War I‟, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 75, 2 (2001), 254-89: 288; Aldrich, op. cit. 
(note 4); Alan Derickson, “To be his own Benefactor”:  The Founding of the Coeur d‟Alene 
Miners‟ Union Hospital, 1891‟, in Rosner and Markowitz (eds), op. cit. (note 6), 3-19; Asher, op. 
cit., (note 6); and Anthony Bale, „America‟s First Compensation Crisis:  Conflict over the Value 
and Meaning of Workplace Injuries under the Employers‟ Liability System‟, in Rosner and 
Markowitz (eds), op. cit. (note 6), 34-52. 
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not just the health of the individual or that of the community, but it also impacts the 
locally available healthcare.  Within the complicated context of the Lowell Corporation 
Hospital, healthcare became both a community specific and a political diagnosis.  An 
unintended outcome was that the textile employers essentially invented what is now 
labelled corporate health care.   
 
The antebellum Lowell Corporation Hospital:  combining benevolence, corporate 
strategy and clinical excellence 
From the start, Lowell was an exceptional city and its history is well documented.
9
  
Located only twenty-three miles (thirty-eight km) north of Boston on the Merrimack 
River, the men who built the town‟s mills were at the same time independent investors 
and a group of local entrepreneurs who cooperated on matters mutually beneficial to 
themselves and the town.  They advertised to the world that their workforce of young 
women, initially recruited from outlying New England farms, was well housed in 
supervised company boardinghouses, well paid, well fed and intellectually active.  
Moreover, the employers believed it their paternalistic duty to look after their workforce 
                                                 
9
 For example:  Thomas Dublin, Women at Work:  The Transformation of Work and Community 
in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860 (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1979; 1993 ed.); 
Janet Greenlees, Female Labour Power:  Women Workers’ Influence on Business Practices in the 
British and American Cotton Industries, 1780-1860 (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2007); Robert Weible 
(ed.), The Continuing Revolution:  A History of Lowell, Massachusetts (Lowell:  Lowell 
Historical Society, 1991) and Lawrence Gross, The Course of Industrial Decline:  The Boott 
Cotton Mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, 1835-1955 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins, 1993). 
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and they expressed a genuine interest in their employees‟ well-being.10  This approach 
succeeded because parents allowed their daughters to live and work in Lowell.  On the 
other hand, the Lowell mill women were not the loyal, passive workforce that employers 
had hoped.  By the mid-1830s, the Yankee mill-women, who cherished their 
independence and rights as daughters of freemen, were organizing strikes to protest wage 
reductions and rising boarding house rates.
11
  While strike success was mixed, 
collectively they signalled to employers that a change of business strategy was needed to 
reassert their authority and control and prevent labour legislation.  This included the 
planning of the LCH in the late 1830s.   
The building of the Corporation Hospital was a visible sign of the employers‟ 
welfare paternalism.  It also addressed Massachusetts physicians growing concerns about 
the health of women and children employed in cotton factories.
12
  Medical and political 
debates about the impact of factory conditions on workers‟ health increased during the 
panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression which lasted through the 1840s.
13
  At the same 
                                                 
10
 Dublin, op. cit. (note 8), 77-78. 
11
 For more on the strikes and their outcomes, see Greenlees, op. cit. (note 8), 163-166. 
12
 Dr. Douglas spoke on this issue at the convention of the National Trades‟ Union in 1835 and 
1836.  J. Commons, et al., History of Labour in the United States, I, (New York:  Macmillan, 
1918), op cit., 436,as cited in George Rosen, „The Medical Aspects of the Controversy over 
Factory Conditions in New England, 1840-1850‟, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, XV, 5 
(May 1944), 483-91:  488, n. 15. 
13
 Rosen, op. cit. (note 11), 488-89; The Rev. Henry A Miles was a well-known apologist of the 
factory system who argued mill work was not detrimental to women‟s health.  Rev Henry A 
Miles, Lowell, As It Was, And As It Is (Lowell:  Nathaniel Dayton, 1846). 
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time, paternalistic philanthropy held business practicalities.  Caring for sick workers 
meant that not only would they return to work more quickly, but the hospital prevented 
them from returning home, possibly never to return.  It extended the employers‟ authority 
into yet another area of the women‟s lives while also serving their business agenda. 
The complexities behind the founding of the Lowell Corporation Hospital 
increase when it is placed within the existing healthcare matrix of Lowell.  The LCH was 
not the employers‟ first healthcare initiative.  When the city‟s first mayor, the physician 
Elisha Bartlett, opened a dispensary in Lowell in 1836 the millowners contributed funds. 
While many antebellum employers contributed to dispensaries, the Corporation‟s 
contributions helped increase their local political influence.  Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the dispensary was a core healthcare provider in Lowell. Its services and 
„medicine and attendance [were provided] gratuitously‟ to all city residents.14  Similar to 
other antebellum dispensaries, city officials, bankers, attorneys and local businessmen, 
including Corporation representatives, comprised the Lowell Dispensary board of 
managers.  Early members included John Clark, Superintendent of the Merrimack 
Corporation, John Aiken, Superintendent of the Suffolk Manufacturing Company and 
James Cook, Agent of the Middlesex Corporation.  By 1842, they had been joined by 
representatives from the Appleton, Tremont and Boott Mills.
15
  Dispensary managers 
                                                 
14
 Lowell, Massachusetts, City Directory (Livonia, MA:  Cole, 1845). James G Carney, Chairman 
of Managers and Joseph F Trott, Secretary and Treasurer.  This may have been the predecessor to 
the Lowell General Hospital. 
15
 George Motley was superintendent of the Appleton Mills; Charles L Tilden was superintendent 
of the Tremont Mills; and Benjamin D French was superintendent of the Boott Mills.  Benjamin 
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quickly realized that it was an inadequate facility for a city whose population had more 
than tripled in the ten years between 1830 and 1840, from 6,477 to 20,981.
16
  
Furthermore, the dispensary was destined to become a focal point for the poor.  Those 
who could afford it were already seeking healthcare and advice privately from the 
growing number of physicians in the city.  In 1840, when the hospital opened in the 
former home of manufacturer Kirk Boott, twenty-eight physicians provided services in 
Lowell.
17
  Hence, the Corporation Hospital consolidated the employers‟ healthcare 
provision, made it part of the business accumulation matrix and increased their 
community standing, while also addressing many of the healthcare needs of a rapidly 
growing community.   
The impulse behind most voluntary hospitals typically came from physicians who 
made alliances with wealthy and powerful sponsors, with some states also contributing 
funds.
18
  A different pattern emerged in Lowell.  In 1839, hospital investors approached 
the Lowell based Dr Gilman Kimball (1804-92) to be physician and surgeon to their 
hospital.  Following common practice in securing top hospital positions, Kimball had 
previous connections with leading Corporation members.  He was related through his 
                                                                                                                                                 
Floyd, The Lowell Directory:  Containing Names of the Inhabitants (Livonia, MA:  Cole, 1838).  
Turner’s Lowell Directory and Annual Register (Livonia, MA:  Cole Publications, 1842), x. 
16
 A. Eno (ed.), Cotton was King:  A History of Lowell, Massachusetts (Somersworth:  New 
Hampshire Publishing Co.), 255. 
17
 B. Floyd, The Lowell Directory (Lowell, MA:  Leonard Huntress, 1840), 32-33. 
18
 Rosenberg, op. cit. (note 5), 105-07. 
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mother‟s family to both the Aiken‟s and Appleton‟s.19  Indeed, other relatives of the 
Lowell elite held positions at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston.
20
  Through 
patronage, trustees anticipated loyalty.  Yet while family connections may have aided the 
acquisition of key hospital positions, they bore no relationship to the quality of care.   
When appointing Kimball, the Corporation could scarcely have imagined that 
during his regime, Kimball would ensure the hospital was at the forefront of medical 
thinking and make it a centre for gynaecological excellence – an unsurprising choice in a 
city of women. Nor did the Corporation expect Kimball would bring their views into line 
with current medical thinking.  Kimball was a high profile appointment.  He had studied 
medicine at Dartmouth College, graduating in 1826.  He then worked in Boston and 
attended lectures at Harvard Medical College while regularly visiting the wards of 
Massachusetts General Hospital.  In 1829, Kimball travelled to Paris to study anatomy 
and surgery at the largest and in many respects, the best appointed hospital in Paris - the 
Hotel Dieu.  Here, Kimball trained with the head of its surgical department, Baron 
Guillaume Dupuytren.  Dupuytren was the most popular, as well as the ablest teacher of 
surgery on the continent of Europe.  In 1830 Kimball returned with his certificate in 
surgery and set up practice in Lowell.   
When Kimball accepted the Corporation‟s offer to lead the hospital, he, along 
with other physicians viewed hospitals as a way to further medical education and as a 
                                                 
19
 Kimball‟s mother Mary was an Aiken.  He was also distantly related to John Aiken and Nathan 
Appleton.  My thanks to Martha Mayo, University of Massachusetts, Lowell (UML), Center for 
Lowell History (CLH), for building this family tree on Ancestry.com. 
20
 Vogel, op. cit. (note 5), 5-6.  
 12 
source of personal prestige.  Through his appointment, Kimball had gained the business 
and political support needed to ensure personal recognition and the financial support to 
ensure the viability of the hospital and to counter the public‟s distrust of doctors‟ 
motives.
21
  In most towns, hospital sponsorship was promoted as an additional 
responsibility for the wealthy, alongside funding other community facilities, such as 
churches and schools.
22
  Yet while hospital philanthropy converted wealth into status and 
influence, the Lowell businessmen had already secured their local prominence.  They 
provided civic amenities, including St. Anne‟s Church, the Lowell Institute for Savings 
Bank and schools.  Individually and collectively, they were the largest employers in 
town; they provided decent workers‟ housing; and, they dominated the early town 
council.  Therefore, the Hospital only expanded the Corporation‟s influence and social 
standing in the city.  It did not create it.  Rather, the Corporation Hospital enhanced 
Lowell‟s social capital in a way different to the European model cities of New Lanark, 
Scotland and Norköping, Sweden.  In both towns, textile employers sought control over 
all aspects of their employees working lives.  Yet while they provided housing and some 
                                                 
21
 History of the Reading Hospital, 1867-1942 (Reading, PA:  The Reading Hospital, 1942), as 
cited in Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York:  Basic Books, 
1982), 152; see also chapter 4. 
22
 Donations and bequests rarely covered medical costs at voluntary hospitals.  Patients were 
expected to make up the difference.  Starr cites the example of the Pennsylvania Hospital.  R. W. 
Downie, „Pennsylvania Hospital Admissions, 1751-1850: A Survey‟, Transactions and Studies of 
the College of Physicians, 32 (1964), 25, as cited in Starr, op. cit. (note 20), 154. 
 13 
civic amenities, their benevolence did not extend to hospital provision.
23
  The unusual 
decision to invest in the LCH aided the Corporation‟s goal of making Lowell a model 
industrial city, helping them earn a reputation as „good‟ employers. 
 
Dr Gilman Kimball, c. 1875. Image courtesy of the Lowell Historical Society, 
Lowell. Massachusetts 
Kimball was the driving force behind the success of the Corporation Hospital as a 
medical venture.  The hospital provided systematized, structured healthcare for the city 
and helped combat the urban public health problems evident by 1840.  Cases of 
infectious diseases, particularly typhoid, dysentery and smallpox were rising in Lowell 
                                                 
23
 Ian Donnachie and George Hewitt, Historic New Lanark:  The Dale and Owen Industrial 
Community since 1785 (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 1993) and A. Ohlander, „The 
invisible child?  The struggle for a Social Democratic Family Policy in Sweden, 1900-1960s‟ in 
Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (eds), Maternity and Gender Policies:  Women and the Rise of the 
European Welfare States, 1880s-1950s (London:  Routledge, 1994), 60-72. 
 14 
during the 1830s and mortality rates were high.  To address these public health crises, in 
1836, Lowell became one of the first towns in Massachusetts to establish a local Board of 
Health.  The subsequent opening of the Corporation Hospital provided at least the 
appearance of disease management because typhoid fever was the most prevalent disease 
amongst operatives. Typhoid and fever cases comprised half the hospital admittances 
during its first ten years of operation (see Table 1).
24
  However, the problematic nature of 
diagnosing specific types of fever cases might exaggerate these figures.  While the LCH 
sought to prohibit contagious diseases, this policy was difficult to maintain if ill workers 
were to be removed from boardinghouses.  The LCH had no prescribed isolation wards 
until the 1880s.  Instead, Kimball tried to segregate contagious patients.  He mandated 
that wards be smaller than at other urban hospitals with no more than four or five beds.  
In exceptional cases, such as typhoid, when possible, an entire ward was appropriated to 
one patient to minimize the risk of contagion.
25
   
From the start of his 26 year tenure at the LCH in 1840, Kimball claimed that he 
knew „of no other Hospital where this condition [quietude and small wards] is so strictly 
enjoyed, and so thoroughly maintained.‟  His emphasis on disease prevention marked a 
contrast to elsewhere in America where this was either non-existent or considered 
ineffective until after Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch made their scientific breakthroughs  
 
                                                 
24
 816 cases of typhoid were recorded out of 1627 admittances.  (UML, CLH), Lowell Hospital 
Association, Registry of Patients, 1840-87; Gilman Kimball, Report of the Lowell Hospital 
Association, from 1840 to 1849 (Lowell: n.p., 1849), 4-6 and 9.   
25
 Kimball, op cit. (note 23), 6-11, 15. 
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Table 1 













Dysentery   96  8 
Pneumonia   62  2 
Bronchitis   54  0 
Rheumatism   65  0 
Scarletina   28  1 
Measles   33  1 
Consumption   15  6 
Small Pox & Varioloid   51  6 
All others 407 12 
Total                    1627 77 
 
 
Kimball classified a total of 71 different diseases admitted to the hospital during these 
years. Only the most prevalent are listed above.  Kimball, Report, 1849, 4 and UML, 
CLH:  Lowell Hospital Association, Registry of Patients, 1840-87.  
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in bacteriology during the 1860s and 1880s.
26
  Moreover, Kimball‟s efforts were pre-
Lister‟s development of effective antiseptic techniques in 1867.  Indeed, the medical 
profession was slow to develop an antiseptic conscience because the techniques were 
difficult to reproduce.
27
  Hence, from the start, Kimball set high hygienic standards for 
the LCH which helped secure it medical recognition. 
Kimball also emphasised patient centred care.  In his first hospital report of 1849, 
Kimball stressed how at the LCH, patients were visited by one physician only (excepting 
in cases of consultation), by no assistants and no medical pupils, as was common practice 
at many hospitals.  Treatment comprised holistic care.  This was ensured, as „in no 
instance is a patient allowed to witness a death, or know that such an event has occurred 
in this establishment. Indeed, everything which may be supposed to operate injuriously 
on the mind or the senses, is most studiously avoided.‟ 28  This regime ensured the 
hospital was at the forefront of medical thinking.   
However, keeping the LCH in line with current medical thinking was not simply 
for the operatives‟ benefit.  The Corporation Hospital was also a community resource. 
The poor were not refused.  Such a policy addressed the belief widespread in America 
that medical care was a right for the poor.
29
  To further enhance its social mission, while 
also meeting community needs, in 1840 the Corporation Hospital opened a fifteen bed 
                                                 
26
 Starr, Social Transformation (note 20), 135. 
27
 Ibid., 156. 
28
 Kimball, op. cit. (note 23), 8. 
29
Charles Rosenberg, „Inward Vision and Outward Glance: The Shaping of the American 
Hospital, 1880–1914‟, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 53 (1979), 346–91: 371-72. 
 17 
children‟s ward. This was the first such facility in Massachusetts.  Indeed, the city held 
high expectations for the hospital.  In 1840, the City Directory noted that the Lowell 
Hospital Association was a new benevolent association that promised „great good‟ for the 
city.
30
  Civic leaders were convinced that Lowell was becoming a model industrial city.  
Despite community expectations, the LCH was not designed simply to be a 
lodging house for sick workers or a token of charity or to fulfil civic and social needs.  
Similar to voluntary hospitals, the Lowell Hospital incorporated social supervision into 
its mission.  Company employees who entered the hospital were at the sufferance of their 
benefactors, in this case, their employers.  This corporate control complemented the strict 
behaviour codes both at work and in company boarding houses.  Yet control is only 
successful when the intended recipients act within the given constraints.  While 
millworkers voluntarily maintained certain behavioural codes, they also sought to 
preserve their autonomy in the workplace and over their lives as individuals and private 
citizens. In the factory, women workers sought to retain control over their availability for 
work, with some success, sometimes staying home to sew or because of bad weather.
31
  
                                                 
30
 Floyd, op. cit. (note 15), 28-29.  
31
 Eg. In 1847, Mary Lucinda Hovey, an operative at the Suffolk Mills in Lowell, called in sick 
two days at the mills to stay home and sew.  Lucinda Hovey to Elizabeth M Stevens, August 
1847. (UML, CLH).   For refusing to work in bad weather, see Fortieth Annual Report of the 
State Board of Health of Massachusetts (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1908), 718.  Greenlees has 
demonstrated how some mill women successfully controlled their working hours despite 
employers‟ attempts to regulate the working day.  Op. cit. (note 8), ch 5, esp. 132-45.  This 
revises histories that argue Lowell manufacturers increasingly controlled the working day, eg. 
Dublin, op. cit. (note 8), 198-207 and Tamara Hareven and Randolph Langenbach, Amoskeag: 
 18 
Some of the leaders of the ten hour movement of the 1840s were Lowell mill women who 
argued that a shorter day was necessary to preserve workers‟ health.32  And, while mill 
workers used the hospital, they also sought to preserve the right to choose their healthcare 
provider.  In addition, because the Corporation Hospital served both community and 
employee needs, and because alternative medical provision was available in Lowell, 
viewing the hospital purely as another form of employers‟ social control must be done 
with some caution.  The LCH served the employers‟ business agenda but it also provided 
a community resource.  Moreover, because Kimball was such a forceful medical 
presence, he challenged the employers on certain health issues while also keeping the 
hospital at the forefront of medicine.  By doing so, he brought the Corporation and the 
city in line with current medical thought.  
Kimball‟s success in raising the profile of the Corporation Hospital was due to 
both his medical skills and his authority within the hospital. The benefactors of many 
early American hospitals frequently sat on the boards and held the final decision-making 
power - not the physicians.
33
 In Lowell, this was not the case.  Kimball directed hospital 
operations. Although not on the board, Kimball‟s autonomy was such that when 
necessary, he freely and openly criticized his employers, the cotton manufacturers.  For 
example, Kimball berated the cotton masters for allowing unhealthy environments in both 
                                                                                                                                                 
Life and Work in an American Factory-City (Hanover:  University Press of New England, 1978), 
1-34, esp 13-28.  
32
 Dublin, op. cit. (note 8), chapter 7; Greenlees, op. cit. (note 8), 194-96 and Rosen, op. cit. (note 
11), 490-91. 
33
 Starr, op. cit. (note 20), 151-53. 
 19 
the mills and boardinghouses.  He argued that many mills, „if not all of them, are more or 
less imperfectly supplied with pure air‟. Sometimes this was due to the „mere 
thoughtlessness or negligence of the overseers‟.  At other times, production needs 
determined ventilation, not employee well-being.
34
  Yet Kimball considered the latter 
paramount to both production and disease prevention.  While he acknowledged that 
certain atmospheric conditions were necessary for production, Kimball argued that poor 
ventilation contributed to the spread of typhoid fever.   
Imperfect ventilation and infection are almost invariably spoken 
of as associated evils in connection with the origin and prevalence 
of [typhoid] fever, in the manufacturing towns of Europe; and I 
very much mistake, if these same evils, though probably to a 
much less extent, are not found to have a very important bearing 
upon this same disease as it appears here in the city of Lowell.  I 
am aware that this idea, particularly as regards infection, has been 
opposed by some few of our physicians, and in some instances, I 
fear, with an unfavorable effect.
35
   
While the employers‟ response to Kimball‟s challenge to reform business practices is 
unknown, Kimball‟s confidence in his own authority is clear.   
Kimball also targeted the corporation boardinghouses for health improvements.  He 
claimed ventilation was worse here than in the mills due to overcrowding and negligence 
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  Kimball admitted that overcrowding could not be addressed without the 
Corporation‟s consent, but argued that there was no excuse for poor cleanliness and not 
separating ill people from the healthy for „comparative security to the rest of the 
household.‟37  For Kimball, disease prevention was everyone‟s responsibility - employer 
and employee, boarder and boardinghouse keeper.  
During the 1840s, the Corporation increased the health function of the 
boardinghouse keepers.  Rather than simply move sick workers to the „sick room‟ in the 
house, boardinghouse keepers were now threatened with dismissal if sick operatives did 
not enter the hospital.  Sick workers were threatened with eviction if they did not consent 
to hospital admittance.  In 1849, Kimball wrote to boardinghouse keepers.  
It is requested that all boardinghouse keepers will use all proper 
means to induce the sick among their boards to available 
themselves of the privileges; and  notice is herby given the 
neglect or refusal, on the part of any occupant of any 
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boardinghouse, to carry out this request, will be considered 
sufficient cause for terminating the occupancy of said house.
 38
 
This statement can be interpreted in three ways:  as a corporate attempt to force its 
services on workers; from a genuine concern for employee well-being; or it could be 
related to the recent death of a boarder.  Her boardinghouse keeper was charged and tried 
for her death because he moved her to another house rather than taking her to the 
hospital.  Hence, Kimball‟s sanctions promoted the hospital as the place for healthcare, 
reassured parents about their daughters‟ well-being, while also helping repair the 
corporation‟s image after her death.   
Because Kimball argued his case for broad health reforms in the Hospital‟s Annual 
Report, Kimball was openly criticising his employers despite having no power of 
enforcement.  Reforming working and living conditions was part of not just Kimball‟s 
health reform agenda, but also that of other Lowell physicians.  Together, city physicians 
tackled overcrowding and poor ventilation in all public buildings.  Their efforts were 
rewarded when incidents of contagious diseases in the city declined.
39
  Indeed, in 1849, 
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the local newspaper, The Lowell Courier, acknowledged the physicians‟ argument about 
the „intimate connection between health and cleanliness‟ and highlighted „how 
thoroughly the suggestions of the Board of Health have been carried out.‟40  Moreover, 
these reforms correlated with the broader sanitary movement in both America and 
Britain.
41
  Thus, Kimball‟s management of the LCH paralleled the broader public health 
movement. 
Despite Kimball‟s health improvement campaigns and emphasis on hospital care, 
Lowell residents were slow to turn to the hospital as a primary source of healthcare.  This 
is unsurprising.  In antebellum America, healthcare traditionally centred on the family.  
Outside help was brought in only when necessary.  Even then, the burden of 
responsibility for caring for the sick remained with the family.  Until the 1870s, hospitals 
were thought to weaken family ties through separation.  Furthermore, many people, 
including mill operatives, believed hospitals were the last resort for medicine or cures.  
                                                 
40
 „Health of the City‟, The Lowell Courier, August 22, 1849 
41
 Lemuel Shattuck, Report of a General Plan for the Promotion of General and Public Health 
Devised, Prepared and Recommended by the Commissioners Appointed under a Resolve of the 
Legislature of Massachusetts, Relating to a Sanitary Survey of the State (Boston, MA, 1850); 
John Griscom, The Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population of New York City (New York:  
Harper, 1845) – This report is among the first to relate poverty with disease.   In Britain, Edwin 
Chadwick and statistician William Farr led the sanitary movement.  See, Edwin 
Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain. A 
Supplementary Report on the results of a Special Inquiry into The Practice of Internment in 
Towns (London: R. Clowes and Sons, 1843). 
 23 
They were expensive, unnatural and potentially demoralizing.
42
  This belief was not 
without merit.  In most cases, a home environment and the nursing care of „family 
members provided the ideal conditions for restoring health‟.  Only the most crowded and 
filthy dwellings were inferior to the hospital‟s impersonal ward.43  Mill workers‟ letters 
hint these fears were present in Lowell.  On 2 July, 1847, weaver Marrilla Williams died 
from dysentery in the LCH.  Her friend, Mary Hovey bemoaned:  
how bad to die so far away from all friends who care for you 
among those whose only wish is as seems to be to have you out of 
sight that they may get your money and clothes & c…. I think the 
treatments she received during her sickness was anything but fair 
and when she died it was six oclock in the morning and she was 
buried at two in the afternoon & I would just tell you another 




However, operatives‟ held diverse perceptions of the LCH.  Another weaver, Amy 
Galusha, wrote matter-of-factly to her family about how she spent one week very ill with 
varioloid in the LCH in March 1849 and then recuperated in a Lowell boardinghouse.  
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She did not consider her hospital experience unpleasant.
45
  Workers‟ mixed attitudes 
towards the Lowell Corporation Hospital suggest that while the hospital probably 
defended corporate interests, the community recognised that it fulfilled certain health 
needs for the city. 
  Over time, the reputation of the LCH grew and the city recognized Kimball‟s 
growing medical expertise.  These comprised more than disease prevention and public 
health improvements.  While in tenure at the Corporation Hospital, Kimball became a 
pre-eminent gynaecological surgeon.  The large proportion of women in Lowell makes 
this specialism unsurprising.  And, Kimball was not the sole Lowell physician to choose 
this specialty or to gain medical recognition for pioneering gynaecological surgery.  In 
June 1853, another Lowell physician, Walter Burnham, performed the first successful 
abdominal hysterectomy - by mistake.
46
  Later that year, on 1 September, Kimball 
completed the first deliberate, successful subtotal abdominal hysterectomy for fibroids 
under chloroform anaesthesia in Boston.
47
  Kimball was also one of the first doctors in 
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America to successfully complete one of the most formidable operations then known in 
surgery - the ovariotomy.  He completed over 300 such surgeries before his death and 
continually emphasised the importance of antiseptic methods.
48
  In addition, Kimball 
made significant contributions to the medical fields of gastrotomy and gynaecology with 
further advances in the oophorectomy, uterine extirpation and the treatment of fibroid 
tumours by electricity.  Having learned the clinical uses of electricity while studying in 
Europe, Kimball was the first American surgeon to utilise it.  These medical 
achievements gained Kimball both local and national recognition.  After leaving the LCH 
in 1866, Kimball became the first president of the Middlesex North District Medical 
Society in 1871-72.
49
  And, in 1882, he became the eighth president of the American 
Gynecological Society (founded in 1876) and was the only officeholder from Lowell 
throughout the Society‟s history.50   
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Although no surgical cases were listed at the Corporation Hospital until 1857, 
Kimball‟s growing reputation as a surgeon secured the Hospital broad recognition.  
Patients and practitioners from elsewhere in America and overseas, sought Kimball‟s 
expertise, although many surgeries were preformed in Boston rather than Lowell.  The 
Corporation benefitted from Kimball‟s achievements by association.  A company hospital 
with a high profile physician at the helm could not help but raise the Corporation‟s 
profile as „good‟ employers.  Moreover, Dr Gilman‟s Kimball‟s skills and reputation 
raised the LCH to a prominence never imagined by the hospital organizers in 1840.  This 
could only have reaffirmed the investors‟ commitment to the hospital.  At the same time, 
the broader determination of Lowell physicians to improve the health of the city helped 
place the hospital at the centre of medical provision in the community, while also 
bringing leading townspeople, including the textile employers, into line with current 
medical thinking. 
 
A changing workforce and a changing city:  The Lowell Corporation Hospital in the 
late nineteenth century 
In the late nineteenth century, the context surrounding the employers‟ continued financial 
support of the Lowell Corporation Hospital changed.  Lowell was growing rapidly.  The 
population more than doubled between 1860 and 1890, with immigrants arriving from 
many countries.
51
  They changed the ethnic and cultural composition of both the city and 
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  Moreover, an increasingly progressive state legislature sought to 
reform business practices.  Parallel to the rapidly changing social and political 
environment, Lowell‟s medical market also changed.  St John‟s Hospital opened in 1867.  
Hence, the Corporation had to address how the hospital could meet the changing needs of 
both business and the Lowell community. 
The rising immigrant labour force in Lowell held multiple outcomes for 
employers.  The textile employers welcomed them. Immigrants were willing to work for 
lower wages than native-born workers.  New immigrants were less likely to unionize than 
native-born workers; and, they were more likely to allow their children to work in the 
mills.  These benefits all aided the employers‟ introduction of new technologies and work 
regimes designed to increase output and lower labour costs, while sustaining shareholder 
dividends.  Labour and shopfloor changes also necessitated political manoeuvrings.  As 
wealthy businessmen, the textile manufacturers held strong control of the Massachusetts 
Republican Party which opposed labour reforms, particularly the post-Civil War 
resurgence of the ten-hour movement in Massachusetts.  At the same time, low wages, 
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poor working conditions and child labour hurt the Corporation‟s public image.53  
However, Massachusetts lawmakers were some of the most progressive in America and 
its labour unions the most organised.  In 1874, the state legislature passed a ten-hours‟ 
bill for women and children.  This was followed by a maximum hours‟ law, the 
legalisation of unions, and the outlawing of both blacklists and intimidation.
54
  Their lack 
of success at preventing labour legislation increased employers fears about state 
encroachment in business. They sustained a continuous political lobby against industrial 
regulation.  At the same time, the sustained welfare paternalism evident in the LCH 
provided a positive focus for outsiders, rather than the poor workplace practices.  Despite 
the changing composition of the labour force and the increasing state regulation of 
business, the employers sustained their commitment to providing hospital care for their 
sick and injured workers‟ and the Lowell community.   
As the city of Lowell grew, so too did the choices for healthcare.  While the 
employers sought to sustain the high quality healthcare after Kimball left the LCH, the 
opening of St John‟s Hospital created new challenges.  St John‟s quickly rivalled the 
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clinical excellence of the LCH through improvements to aseptic techniques.
55
  Moreover, 
it was a catholic hospital.  Many of the new immigrants to Lowell were catholic, notably 
the Irish and French-Canadians and St John‟s was their hospital of choice.  Workers 
preferred to retain religious and cultural ties and choose their healthcare provider from 
the many physicians, alternative practitioners and the two hospitals in Lowell. 
By 1900, public health improvements meant that fevers no longer comprised the 
majority of hospital admittances at the LCH.  Mill injuries now made up the significant 
share.
56
  From the Lawrence Manufacturing Company alone, of the 348 injuries occurring 
between 1899 and 1905, 261 or 75% of cases were admitted to the LCH.  Rather than 
wondering if the rising number of accident cases related to deteriorating factory 
conditions, mill owners instead ascribed workers‟ with a reluctance to use the facility.  
They complained that amongst mill workers there was a:   
…deep and general prejudice prevailing among those who come 
here for employment, in whose minds the very idea of a hospital 
has been associated with scenes of anguish and terror; and whose 
reluctance to become inmates of one is increased by a feeling of 
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independence and a repugnance to submit to such restraint and 
control as they imagine may be required.57   
Nevertheless, the employers remained committed to their hospital as both a worker and 
community facility.  Indeed, more people benefitted from the hospital than would benefit 
from workplace improvements. 
 As both a community and worker facility, the hospital had to update its services in 
line with current medical thinking and because of rising healthcare costs.  The LCH 
expanded hospital services and sought efficiencies.  During the 1870s and 1880s hospital 
facilities were modernized.  In order to secure their centrality as a community resource, 
the LCH continued to admit children, while St John‟s did not.  This rationale sought to 
encourage the community and particularly families to use the one hospital for all its 
healthcare needs.  Moreover, in June 1877, the Corporation Hospital became the first 
hospital in the city to open an outpatient department which provided free medical care to 
all city residents with medicines furnished at cost to the poor.
58
  In 1887, the hospital 
opened both an isolation ward and a training school for nurses.  This was one of the 
earliest nurse training schools in America and the first in Lowell.
59
  The nursing 
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curriculum at the LCH was similar to that of „some of the best hospitals of [America‟s] 
larger cities.‟  The nursing school was designed to increase hospital efficiency by 
providing it with an inexpensive, stable and disciplined workforce, while also supplying 
the community with trained nurses.
60
  The school became „recognized by all to be far 
superior to any other plan of Hospital nursing.‟61  Lastly, the LCH was the first hospital 
in Lowell to appoint a woman physician in 1891 – Dr Sara A Williams.62  Combined, 
these initiatives addressed a social mission while also reflecting general trends in hospital 
development in America.  They also highlighted the employers‟ continued benevolence at 
a time when health care debates held prominent public attention.
63
  A modern community 
hospital and welfare paternalism were doubly useful.  A hospital cared for the community 
from which came their labourforce, while also helping to sustain a positive corporate 
image.  
By the late nineteenth century too, corporate interest and investment in the LCH 
had become a business custom.  The LCH was an established, successful, community 
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facility.  The close networks between city employers and their associated shared values, 
needs and purposes paralleled individual competitive advantage.  Some of the early 
decisions, particularly the employers‟ recognition of their responsibility to care for their 
sick or injured workers, had become routine.  For example, during the 1880s and 1890s 
the Boott Mills were one of Lowell‟s largest textile employers with a notorious reputation 
for poor working conditions.
64
  Yet, the Boott considered it „custom‟ for the firm to pay a 
doctor „for employees who get maimed in our mills.‟ However, free medical care was not 
an acknowledgement of employer accountability.
65
  Instead, the altruistic hospital 
provision held political and ideological meanings.  Paternalism was not simply a political 
tool.  It was ingrained within the business matrix and helped to address the challenges of 
the changing political and social context, while also filling a community need.   
The labour unrest and labour reform politics that made Massachusetts the most 
progressive of the northeastern textile centres also contributed to the employers‟ 
commitment to the LCH.  Paternalism limited factory inspections which allowed for 
labour laws to be broken when desirable.  Moreover, the corporate financing of the LCH 
eliminated the need for any government subsidy which was increasingly necessary at 
many hospitals, thereby also helping limit state interference in Lowell.
66
  Patching up 
sick and injured workers was also cheaper than spending vast amounts of money 
updating and modernizing factory machinery.  And, workplace improvements would only 
benefit a section of Lowell‟s population. The employers‟ sense of civic duty and 
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philanthropy never completely vanished.  The reforms introduced at the LCH paralleled 
the broader hospital reforms occurring throughout America.  Hence, welfare paternalism 
held multiple advantages.  While some of these benefits changed during the hospital‟s life 
span, the altruism of community hospital provision remained constant. 
  
Medical advancements, economic decline and the Lowell Corporation Hospital 
in the early twentieth century 
Scientific advancements in the years surrounding 1900 not only enabled medicine to do 
more for patients, they also raised significant challenges for hospital trustees.  The 
Lowell Corporation Hospital trustees still comprised Corporation members. They 
recognized both the civic and medical needs of continually modernising hospital 
equipment and facilities and of standardising operations.
 
  In 1914, the Trustees reported 
that the additional medical equipment purchased „provides a much needed increase in our 
facilities for taking care of larger demands for hospital service.‟67  Parallel to better 
medical facilities and the increased use of the LCH went the rising costs of medical 
technology.  These were of concern to Corporation members, despite the swiftly rising 
dollar value of cotton goods produced in Lowell at the end of the nineteenth century.
68
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Operating costs at the LCH had nearly tripled in the early years of the twentieth century, 
requiring a substantial increase in corporate contributions. (Table 2).  The LCH, along 
with other American hospitals, sought ways to increase their income.
 
 They raised board 
and external charges, sought insurance premiums and tried to lower costs by, among 
other initiatives, restricting certain services.  Ironically, this resulted in making the poor, 
whom the hospitals were originally meant to serve, a liability.
69
  Curative, not chronic 
cases were preferred.  At the same time, insurance and workers‟ compensation made 
medical provision more complicated.  Yet in both financing the hospital and providing 
charity healthcare for Lowell‟s poor, the LCH distinguished itself from other American 
hospitals.  It retained its social mission and commitment to the community. 
The rising insurance premiums posed challenges for hospital finance, some of 
which a Corporate hospital could bypass.  Insurance payments had to meet workers‟ 
compensation laws, particularly the Massachusetts Workman‟s Compensation Act of 
1911, which took effect in 1912.  The Act recognized that the cost of injuries should be 
treated as a production cost.  Many hospitals found that the per diem charges for 
workmen‟s compensation cases usually did not equal the charges for paying patients.70   
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Table 2 
Income sources for the Lowell Corporation Hospital, 1903 and 1914 
  1903 1914 
Employer contributions to 
operating costs $12,600 (54%) $32,858.50 (65%) 
 
Patient contributions to 
operating costs (inpatient & 
outpatient) $8,424.99 (36%) $16,339.12 (32%) 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports, 1903 and 1914.  The remaining income was from X-Rays and 
the sale of medicines - primarily the latter. 
 
 
While hospitals sought to increase their income from insurance companies through 
accepting workmen‟s compensation cases, this indirectly increased hospital charges for 
all patients.
71
  The Lowell situation differed.  The employers‟ financial commitment to 
the LCH enabled them to avoid some of the problems associated with both insurance and 
compensation.  A corporate hospital minimized insurance costs because it limited certain 
liabilities and compensation claims against the employers.  Yet hospital operating costs 
were much higher than employers‟ contributions to an insurance scheme.  At the same 
time, Massachusetts law allowed self-insurance.  The Lowell employers‟ adoption of this 
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practice served to increase the textile firms‟ financial burden for both their workers and 
for the hospital.  It also may well have contributed to the rise in corporate hospital 
contributions seen in Table 2.  Consequently, rather than following the developing 
national trend of relationships growing between hospitals and insurance companies, the 
Lowell Corporation‟s investment and financing of their hospital took a different path.  
Their commitment to the hospital required maximising efficiencies and adopting 
scientific management techniques to deal with the demand for medical services that had 
more than doubled in the ten years prior to 1914.
72
  While scientific management 
followed national trends, in Lowell, the corporate financing provided a divergent model 
of hospital care. 
From the latter quarter of the nineteenth century hospital management at the LCH 
paralleled that of other American hospitals.  After Kimball, succeeding hospital 
physicians and superintendants held less autonomy over hospital procedures.  They were 
also less openly critical of their employers, the textile corporation.  Indeed, the growth of 
management structures at the LCH highlights the shift in operational control from the 
doctors to managers and trustees.  Nevertheless, the Corporation continued to absorb 
most of the operating costs in order to keep patient expenditure manageable, thus 
preserving their earlier philanthropy. 
The Lowell Corporation Hospital‟s commitment to providing affordable 
healthcare for Lowell residents remained at a time when hospital governors elsewhere 
                                                 
72
 Outpatient numbers increased considerably.  Trustees anticipated the hospital would need to 
expand again in a few years.  Annual Report, 1914 (n. 65), 10-12 and Howell, op. cit.(note 6), 32-
33. 
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were rapidly increasing charges to meet rising medical costs.
73
  As Table 3 highlights, 
room and board costs at the LCH remained consistently lower than at the other Lowell 
hospitals and hospitals elsewhere in New England. These charges remained lower 
through the 1920s.  Yet by this time, the textile industry was leaving Lowell for southern 
states where input costs were less.  This increased the financial burden of the hospital for 
those remaining Lowell firms at a time when medical costs were rapidly rising.  
Moreover, by the 1920s, the hospital had moved from the periphery to the centre of both 
medical practice and the public‟s experience of severe illness.74  Welfare paternalism had 
become engrained within the Corporation Hospital‟s mission. 
Despite the employers‟ sustained commitment to their community hospital, 
operatives still viewed it as only one option for healthcare.  Catholic workers still 
preferred St John‟s. Other operatives chose Lowell General Hospital, which opened in 
1893, or utilised the many doctors and other healthcare providers in the city.
75
  For  
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 Vogel, op. cit.(note 5), 120.  
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 Ibid., 119. 
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 In addition to many independent physicians practising in Lowell, alternative therapies held a 
continuous strong presence.  For example, Dr George P. Madden‟s Hyropathic Institution was 
well established by the late nineteenth century.  Advert in P J Lynch, Souvenir History of St 
John’s Hospital, written for the Quarter-Centennial Celebration of the founding of the Institution 
(Lowell:  Morning Mail Print, 1892), 89.  Father John‟s Medicine developed at the Lowell 
pharmacy Carleton and Hovey in 1855 as a non-alcoholic cough medicine for Father John 
O‟Brien.  Comprising mostly cod liver oil, it went on to be produced for mass consumption and 
was initially promoted by Father John.  It was produced in the city until the 1980s when 
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Table 3 
Comparison of the costs for room and board at  
three Lowell Hospitals and two Boston Hospitals 
  Lowell    
  Corporation  
  Hospital (1914) 
  $2.05 week   
  women    $2.75 week men   
 
St John‟s    
Hospital, Lowell 
(1916) 
  Wards $1.50 per    
  Day 
  2 bed room,  
  $2 per day 
 Private room 
 $2.50 - $3.50  
 per day 
   
Lowell General  
Hospital (1911) 
  $7 per week,    
  Ward 
  $10-$35 week,  
  private  
 








                                                                                                                                                 
production moved to Cody, Wyoming.  For more on Father John, see 
http://library.uml.edu/clh/Fath/Fath4.Html.  Accessed 10 February, 2012. 
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Sources:  Report of the Lowell General Hospital for the Year ending May 1
st
, 1911, 55; 
Annual Report of the Lowell Corporation Hospital for the Year 1914 (Lowell, 1915), 5; 
Annual Report of the Fiftieth Year of St John’s Hospital (Lowell, 1916), 10. Vogel, 




example, women could have their baby free of charge at the Corporation Hospital.  
During the interwar years, most women mill workers in Lowell, including Valentine 
Chartrand, delivered their babies at home.  However, some, including Blanche Graham 
were very poor.  Graham had to live with her husband‟s parents.  When she found herself 
pregnant, she delivered her baby at the LCH „because they [the Corporation] paid for 
it‟.76  Indeed, some workers viewed the hospital as a last choice for healthcare only using 
it when in poverty or if injured on the job.
77
  Despite the continual increase in healthcare 
choice in Lowell, the employers‟ commitment to the hospital as both a community and 
worker resource remained.   
                                                 
76
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http://library.uml.edu/clh/OH/MWOL/Chartrand.pdf ; interview with Martha Doherty and 
Blanche Graham, October 12, 1984, now available online at 
http://library.uml.edu/clh/OH/MWOL/Doherty.pdf.  (Hereafter, Lowell Oral History Collection). 
77
 Lowell Oral History Collection, testimony of Anonymous man, October 20, 1984; Martha 
Doherty and Blanche Graham, October 12, 1984. 
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Yet, welfare paternalism could not overcome economic realities.  As the 
remaining Lowell textile firms struggled to meet their many financial obligations, the 
financial crisis crippled the LCH.  With a rising hospital operational deficit, in 1927, the 
Lowell Corporation decided to sell the hospital.  It could no longer afford paternalism 
which drained vital resources necessary to sustain both a dying industry and shareholders.  
The sale price was $85,000 – equivalent to its deficit.78  When no buyer was found, in 
1930 the Corporation essentially gave the hospital to the Boston Archdiocese ($1) on 
condition that the charitable provisions continue for Lowell residents, especially mill 
workers.  Eventually, such extensive charity proved unsustainable.  By 1946, the charity 
funding was depleted.  St Joseph‟s Hospital, as it was renamed, had to increase board 
rates.
79
  The civic gospel mentality that had underpinned the hospital for 100 years had 
finally collapsed under the pressures of economic realities.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has identified a unique corporate entity, the Lowell Corporation Hospital, and 
placed it within its complex, multifaceted context.  In Lowell, the industrial elite chose to 
promote healthcare, and specifically hospital care, as both a worker and community 
resource.  Their ninety year commitment to such provision was an unusual approach for 
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 Op. cit. (note 43). 
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 Saints Memorial Hospital.  St Joseph‟s Hospital Inc. papers, 1946.  Newspaper clipping in 1946 
file (n.d., no title).  „Hospital Council of Lowell Announces Increase in patients‟ Rates‟.  
However, this was only for accommodation.  New rates of $1.50 per day for adults‟ 
accommodation (private, semi-private and ward accommodation).  Newborns, children and 
maternity, 50c to $1 per day. 
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employers.  Yet this commitment meant that the hospital contributed to the economic, 
social and political diagnosis of Lowell, as well as Massachusetts.  To that end, this 
article has extended voluntary and public hospital histories by demonstrating the 
complexities behind donor motivations to meet changing local circumstances.  Indeed, 
hospitals, or any institution, cannot be understood outside of their complicated local and 
national context.   
The Lowell Hospital achieved many successes, both as a corporate venture and as 
a hospital.  No other antebellum employers provided a hospital for their workers.  The 
Corporation were strongly paternalistic, which was probably underpinned by a Protestant 
civic gospel mentality.  Over time, they probably viewed their hospital as a community 
resource that had grown out of their early dispensary contributions designed to provide 
healthcare for all Lowell residents.  Through the employment of Dr Gilman Kimball, the 
Lowell manufacturers unknowingly set a high standard for healthcare for the city and 
New England.  To that end, the early hospital raised the reputation of both the employers 
and Lowell as a model industrial city.  It also served to consolidate the Corporation‟s 
dominance within the city in Lowell, while providing a valuable community resource.   
While the Lowell Hospital was exceptional, it was the product of modern 
medicine in a specific community.  Moreover, the ironies of the hospital investment are 
clear.  The Lowell employers invested in a hospital to patch up their sick and injured 
workers and community residents rather than in prevention strategies.  While the 
altruistic emphasis on curative rather than preventative approaches to health was in line 
with most American medical services, it is somewhat ironic that the Corporation 
purchased new medical technology but not new textile machinery.   The community and 
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local benefits attached to the hospital were more important than modernizing the mill and 
adopting health and safety measures that would only affect a section of the population.  
The neglect of the factory environment unless it posed a public health risk, meant that the 
hot, humid, dusty working environment contributed to high rates of respiratory disease 
amongst mill workers.
80
  Moreover, employers were reluctant to install sanitation in the 
boardinghouses or to provide clean drinking water at work.  Even in the 1890s workers 
drank polluted canal water.
81
  While at the time, the employers‟ hospital gained political 
and public acclaim, it is the poor working conditions inside the cotton factories which are 
remembered today.  A final irony is that the Lowell Corporation effectively invented 
what is now labelled „corporate healthcare‟.  Yet throughout its existence workers were 
unsure what to make of the employers‟ hospital.  To them, it was only one option for 
healthcare from an ever increasing number available in Lowell.   
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